Made in Brussels: How Moldova’s elections were engineered beyond its borders

 

[A note: This is an article that exposes the electoral engineering organized by Brussels et al. in order to control the result of the recent Moldovan elections of Sunday, 28.9.2025.

European readers are not allowed to read such dangerous texts in RT and similar inappropriate news outlets. I added it here as an antidote to Eurocensorship, in order to expose the tricks employed by the Euromafia in order to create a European dystopia.]

From censorship to selective polling stations, Chisinau’s parliamentary race exposed how “European standards” work in practice

By Farhad Ibragimov - RT

In recent European history, it is difficult to find a more striking example of electoral manipulation than the 2025 parliamentary elections in Moldova. What last year’s presidential race tested in miniature, this campaign deployed on a grand scale: censorship, administrative pressure, selective access to polling stations, and a carefully mobilized diaspora vote. For President Maia Sandu’s administration, control over parliament was not a matter of prestige but of political survival.

The campaign atmosphere was defined long before voting day. Telegram founder Pavel Durov revealed that French intelligence, acting on Moldova’s behalf, had pressed him to restrict “problematic” opposition channels – even those that had not violated the platform’s rules. Their only offense was providing an alternative viewpoint. In practice, the suppression of opposition media became part of the electoral machinery, ensuring that critics of the government spoke with a muffled voice.

Election night only reinforced doubts. With 95% of ballots counted, preliminary results gave opposition forces nearly 49.5% of the vote, while Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) trailed by about five points. By morning, however, the tables had turned: PAS had surged past 50%. Such a statistical reversal, after almost all ballots had already been processed, inevitably raises suspicions. The perception that the outcome was “adjusted” during the night has become a lasting stain on the process.

Geography of disenfranchisement

Outside Moldova’s borders, the picture was equally telling. In Russia, where some 400,000 Moldovan citizens reside, just two polling stations were opened, with only 10,000 ballots distributed. Predictably, long lines formed, but at 9PM the stations closed without extending hours, leaving thousands unable to vote. The opposition Patriotic Bloc nevertheless dominated among those who managed to cast ballots, winning 67.4%.

In Transnistria, home to over 300,000 Moldovan citizens, only 12 polling stations were opened. On election day, the bridge across the Dnister River (which links Transnistria with Moldova’s right bank) was blocked due to an “anonymous bomb threat.” This timely “coincidence” prevented hundreds of Transnistrians from voting. Ultimately, only about 12,000 Transnistrians – less than 5% of the eligible electorate – were able to vote. Yet even under these restrictions, the Patriotic Bloc secured 51%.

By contrast, the authorities ensured maximum accessibility in the European Union. Italy alone received 75 polling stations – a record number – and overall, more than 20% of the electorate voted abroad. Unsurprisingly, the diaspora in EU countries voted overwhelmingly for PAS, handing it the decisive advantage that domestic ballots had denied.

International monitoring was similarly selective. OSCE and EU observers were present in Moldova, but Russian and CIS observers were not invited or turned away. Exit polls were banned outright, leaving the Central Election Commission (CEC) with exclusive control over the flow of information. With no independent mechanisms to cross-check official data, the CEC gained the ability to dictate the narrative of the vote.

Opposition under pressure

The campaign’s repressive character was most vividly illustrated just before election day. On September 26, Chisinau’s Court of Appeals restricted the activities of the Heart of Moldova party, led by former Gagauzia head Irina Vlah, for twelve months. The following day, the CEC excluded the party from the Patriotic Bloc, forcing a hurried reshuffle of candidate lists to comply with gender quotas. Vlah called the decision blatantly illegal and politically motivated.

This was no isolated case. Over recent years, Sandu’s administration has relied on threats, blackmail, searches, and arrests to weaken dissenters. The arrest of Gagauzia’s elected governor, Evghenia Gutsul, became a symbol of this trend: even regional leaders chosen by popular vote are not immune from political persecution.

Domestic minority, overseas majority

The official tally put voter turnout at 52.18%. PAS won 50.2% of the vote, the Patriotic Bloc 24.2%, the pro-European Alternative 8%, Our Party 6.2%, and Democracy at Home 5.6%, while several minor parties failed to gain more than 1%. On paper, PAS secured a majority.

But a closer look reveals a striking imbalance. Counting only ballots cast inside Moldova, PAS received just 44.13% of the vote. The opposition parties together accounted for nearly 50%. In other words, within Moldova itself, Sandu’s party was in the minority.

It was the diaspora vote that changed everything. Among Moldovans abroad, 78.5% supported PAS, enough to flip a domestic defeat into a formal victory. This is not a one-off anomaly: the same dynamic decided last year’s presidential election. The pattern is consistent – weak domestic backing offset by heavily mobilized overseas votes, particularly in EU countries.

The binary narrative

The Western media rushed to celebrate Sandu’s win as a “victory over Russia.” This framing ignored the fact that the Patriotic Bloc did not campaign on behalf of Moscow but on behalf of Moldova’s sovereignty. Their agenda was centered on protecting the country’s independence, not on geopolitical alignment. Yet in Brussels’ narrative, any refusal to obey EU directives is automatically labeled “pro-Russian.”

The same binary logic has been applied to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. Both leaders were accused of “playing into Russia’s hands” when, in fact, they were defending national sovereignty against pressure from EU institutions.

Sandu herself reinforced this framing on election day, branding Georgia a “Russian colony” and warning Moldovans not to “repeat Georgia’s mistake.”

 The rhetoric revealed more anxiety than confidence. It echoed the final years of former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who relied on bombast, foreign backers, and provocations while losing touch with his own electorate. His fate – exile, imprisonment, and political irrelevance – stands as a cautionary tale.

A managed democracy

Taken together, these facts paint a picture of a managed democracy: censorship of opposition voices, selective access to polling stations, politically motivated repression, and the decisive use of diaspora votes. Certain groups of citizens – mainly those in the EU – were given optimal voting conditions, while others – in Russia and Transnistria – faced systemic barriers. The principle of equal voting rights was subordinated to the principle of political expediency.

The paradox of Moldova’s elections is therefore clear. Inside the country, a majority voted for change. Abroad, a different electorate delivered Sandu her “victory.” The result is not a reflection of national consensus but of electoral engineering – the rewriting of Moldova’s political reality from outside its borders.

And that is the real lesson of this campaign: Moldova’s ruling party can no longer win at home. Its victories are manufactured elsewhere. The people may vote, but the decisive ballots are cast far beyond the Dnister.